Objective moral values and the moral argument

Every human child, regardless of whether he or she is religious or not, can have moral values and therefore find, for example, the rape of a child objectively morally reprehensible. That is not a matter of taste or merely an arbitrary opinion: such an act is objectively evil and morally reprehensible. Objective moral values are moral truths that will remain true regardless of what any individual or social group thinks or desires. Objective moral values are values that apply completely independently of our human beliefs. Values that depend on people’s opinions are ‘subjective’ and not ‘objective’. The problem is that anyone who denies that God exists cannot point to an ontological ground for this objective reprehensibility, even though it must be there because of the objectivity of the reprehensibility. This is what the philosopher Emanuel Rutten (1973) argues.¹

  • Objective moral values
  • On what does the naturalist base his moral sense?
  • Signal does not lead to fooling around
  • Six positions that the naturalist can rely on
  • The consequences of the naturalistic worldview
  • Objective moral laws require an objective moral Lawgiver
  • The moral argument in a nutshell

 

Objective moral values

Objective moral values ​​and duties exist. That is beyond dispute. The philosopher William Lane Craig (1949) puts it as follows:

  • “In moral experience we appreciate a realm of moral values ​​and duties that impose themselves upon us. There’s no more reason to deny the objective reality of moral values ​​than the objective reality of the physical world.”[2]

There is an objective standard for right and wrong. If you deny that objective moral values ​​exist, then you cannot distinguish between different moral positions, such as those of Adolf Hitler and Nelson Mandel a. Moral relativism is therefore an incorrect position. Human children do not determine what good is evil, but discover it. Assuming the existence of objective moral values ​​and duties is, by its very nature, more obvious than any argument for moral relativism/skepticism. Put another way, we know intuitively that certain things, such as rape, murder, the Holocaust, and all other evils, are objectively morally reprehensible and bad.

On what does the naturalist base his moral sense?

The question is: what does the naturalist, that is, someone who believes that only nature and the observable belong to reality, base his moral sense on? In a comment column on an Orthodox Christian website, someone wrote the following about the foundation of moral values:

  • ‘Evolution is driven by the survival of the species. We call something that is good for the survival of the group or species morally good (= definition). And why is that morally good? Because it is good for the survival of the group. And why is the group’s survival good? Because that is the definition of moral.”[3]

However, this is a circular argument that provides no ontological basis for morality. Because why should the evolutionary mechanism, based on naturalism (where physical matter is the only reality and man is only ‘ matter in motion ‘), be intrinsically valuable? Even if such a mechanism can be detected, it does not follow that we should also act according to that mechanism. Now it can be countered that on the basis of that mechanism we immediately experience these moral values in our moral experience. But what would that be? Your moral experiences provide no basis for the objectivity of moral values. The problem is that moral epistemology is then confused with moral ontology.[4]

No solution
,It is no solution to say that what is morally good is what is evolutionarily advantageous. Evil would then be whatever stands in the way of the survival and reproduction of the human species. However, this forgets that deception, torture and rape can be evolutionarily very advantageous, while normal people still consider this completely immoral behavior.,[5]

 

Signal does not lead to fooling around

Mixing factual findings with the normative leads to confusion and misconceptions. From the ‘establishment’ (it is not important whether this observation is factually correct) that ‘evolution is driven by the survival of the species’ it can never be deduced that this should also happen and that humans should thus to trade. A judgment of being is not a value judgment. There is no logical bridge leading from what is to what ought to be. From the (atheistic) theory of evolution you can say that a certain situation or fact (possibly) contributes to survival or (possibly) is a disadvantage with regard to survival, but nothing more. You cannot deduce from ‘facts’ that it should be that way or that you should act that way. From the psychological fact ‘I feel an instinctive tendency or urge to do x or y’ no practical maxim ‘I must give in to this tendency’ can be deduced with the greatest sagacity.[6] In other words, what is the criterion for determining that what promotes the survival of the species is morally good?

Six positions that the naturalist can rely on

In the article What are moral values? Emanuel Rutten convincingly argues that there appears to be little on which the naturalist can rely to adequately answer the question of the ontological status of moral values, without lapsing into radical nihilism or an all-eroding relativism.[7/8 ] He describes and analyzes six possibilities that the naturalist can rely on. The six possibilities and their refutation are the following:

Foundation of moral values:

Refutation:

Denial: there are no moral values, there are only physical processes of nature.

This leads to a radical form of nihilism, where even the worst atrocities must be regarded as purely physical processes of nature, without moral content. Therefore, they cannot be condemned in any way.

Moral values exist as a kind of abstract Platonic objects.

Hardly any naturalist would be willing to accept a form of platonism. A second objection is that the existence of an abstract Platonic object of, for example, ‘justice’ does not follow that we as humans should also act justly.

Moral values are simply conventions or agreements within a particular community, society or culture.

Conventionalism degenerates into a radical form of relativism, in which there is only a situation of ‘your morality and my morality’. This provides no basis for condemning certain atrocities.

Moral values exist as an inalienable part of our common human nature.

Based on naturalism, why should human nature be something intrinsically valuable? Rutten puts it this way: ,Based on naturalism, man is nothing more than an arbitrary physical-organic product of purposeless undirected evolution. There is no reason whatsoever to label this product as more or less valuable than all kinds of other evolutionary products, such as fish, cats or cows. Based on naturalism, who or what is the reason for the fact that humans, unlike bats, for example, are intrinsically valuable and as such endowed with all kinds of inalienable values? After all, under naturalism, humans are nothing more than a complex physically evolved gene replicator.,[9]

‘Moral sense’ approach: something is simply morally reprehensible because we as humans simply feel that way and cannot help but feel that way.

The problem with this answer is that not everyone has the same moral sense. Furthermore, based on naturalism, why should we listen to something like our ,inner moral voice,? Isn’t, under naturalism, this ‘moral sense’ just the random unintended by-product of physical-evolutionary processes? Based on naturalism, who or what is the basis for considering our inner moral sense as normative?

The naturalist makes a choice for one of the philosophically elaborated normative-ethical systems.

However, all these normative-ethical systems are not meta-ethical positions and therefore do not make a meta-statement about the ontological status of moral values. They only try to answer the normative-ethical question of which moral values we as human beings should strive for. Rutten therefore states: ,The choice for one specific normative-ethical system still poses the naturalist the difficult question of why this normative system should be chosen and not one of the other normative systems.,

Naturalists have a moral sense and can believe in objective good and evil, yet they have no justification for such a belief. They do not have a real basis on which to base his awareness. Naturalism cannot substantiate why something is good or evil. The philosopher therefore comes to the following conclusion:

  • “Under strict naturalism there is no reason to regard all kinds of events in our world as morally objectionable. The claim that morally reprehensible events are taking place in our world, when stated by a naturalist, is immediately ‘self-defeating’. Not because a naturalist would not have a moral sense (having a moral sense of course has nothing to do with whether or not he or she is a naturalist), but precisely because the naturalistic worldview does not provide an ontological basis for morality. The naturalist has nothing to base his consciousness on, except a flight into an all-eroding relativism.”[10]

 

No Moral Absolutes
,Atheists knowing that there is no absolute moral basis for atheists to stand. Based on their belief in Darwin Evolution, atheists believe that they are merely stating a chemical reaction randomly occurring in their brain when atheists state their opinion; thus, an atheist’s opinion is purely meaningless especially when it comes to moral judgments. The evolutionist [atheist] has no basis for moral judgments. If man is just the result of millions of years of evolution, our behavior is based on random chemical reactions. There is no ultimate moral code. All morality is relative.,[11]

 

De consequenties van het naturalistische wereldbeeld

De bekende atheïst Richard Dawkins lijkt (als één van de weinigen) de consequenties van zijn naturalistische wereldbeeld te erkennen:

  • “In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.”[12]

Although Dawkins denies the existence of absolute good and absolute evil, he makes one exception in his book God as a Misconception: religion is absolutely evil, because it is the root of much evil. However, you cannot deny objective evil and at the same time point to religion as evil. That is logically contradictory.

Objective moral laws require an objective moral Lawgiver

The problem a naturalist faces, as a theist will emphasize to someone who believes in a supernatural, personal God, is that although he has a moral sense, his naturalistic worldview does not provide any basis on which to ground his sense. Why, according to a theist, is this the case? Well, before anyone can call something bad, a person must know what is good. But before anyone can call something good, he must have a moral framework to distinguish between good and bad. But before someone has a moral framework on the basis of which he can distinguish between good and bad, he must rely on objective moral values as a foundation. However, objective values do not appear from nowhere, but must be grounded in reality. Objective moral laws require an absolute moral Lawgiver, and the only absolute moral Lawgiver that exists is God. Thus the theist.

According to the theistic view, moral values find their ultimate basis in reality in a source outside humans, a moral Lawgiver, who is called ‘God’. According to this view, God’s ethical order is the only true source of morality and it is also the only possible morality. A theist who is Christian believes that God has written the (objective) standard for good and evil in the ‘heart’ of man.

The moral argument in a nutshell

In their book ‘I don’t have enough faith to be an atheist’, Geisler and Turek discuss, among other things, the moral argument for the existence of God.[13] This is a general argument for the existence of God, in the form of a so-called ‘syllogism’, consisting of two premises and a conclusion. The conclusion is true if the premises are true. In other words, if the first and second premises are correct, then their conclusion is the necessary result.

The moral argument for the existence of God follows:

  • Premise 1: Every law has a lawgiver
  • Premise 2: There is a moral law
  • Conclusion: So there is a moral Lawgiver

Premise 2 states that there is a moral law. Although it is often thought that all morality is relative, objective moral values and duty do exist and do exist. Good and Evil are absolute and do not depend on the opinions of different people in different times. They apply everywhere, always and to everyone. This objective standard for good and evil is written in the hearts of all people. People can deny this standard, suppress it and go against it with their actions, but from their reactions you can see that they are aware of this standard. Every human child experiences morality in an objective way. Hardly anyone in the world would say that torturing babies is a morally neutral act and that being good or bad is just a matter of personal opinion, a matter of taste, or just part of the rules of a specific culture at a certain time. We know intuitively that torturing infants is absolutely reprehensible and wrong based on the operation of our conscience, which is a manifestation of the moral law. Relativism is therefore incorrect. People do not determine what is good and evil, but discover it. Objective morality holds that certain actions of people are bad regardless of what people may think. So if you believe that torturing a baby is objectively evil and not just an opinion, then you are assuming objective morality.

Premise 1 is based on the principle of causality, which means that every effect has a cause. Just as every recipe has a creator, every painting a painter, every office building an architect, every sculpture a sculptor and every piece of legislation a legislator, every moral law has a moral Lawgiver. Prescriptions are always prescribed by someone, they do not appear out of nowhere. Objective moral laws require a source outside (above) ourselves, otherwise you cannot get further than a subjective (and at most intersubjective) morality, where all morality is relative . What is good and evil are then rules developed by people over the course of history that are subjective and dependent on place, time and culture. In that case there are only human opinions and preferences and nothing more. We then no longer talk about a ‘moral law’, while we have argued above that a moral law, an objective standard for justice, does exist.

In short, there is an objective standard for good and evil; there is an objective moral law (premise 2). Prescriptions do not appear out of nowhere, but they are always prescribed by someone (premise 1). It follows that there is an absolute moral Lawgiver. The only absolute moral Lawgiver that exists is God.

Nuts

  1. Emanuel Rutten: What are moral values? http://philosophyblog.nl/blog/emanuel-rutten/2825/wat-zijn-morele-waarden
  2. William Lane Craig: Moral Argument – Objections to the Moral Argument, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/moral-argument
  3. http://www.habakuk.nu/columns/item/3583-de-hel-een-aansporing
  4. Emanuel Rutten: On the reasonableness of theism, http://philosophy.be/blog/emanuel-rutten/3386/over-de-redelijkheid-van-theisme (see ‘response block’)
  5. Prof. Dr. J. Hoek. Without faith, morality cannot be explained. http://www.refdag.nl/opinie/zonder_trouw_is_moraal_niet_uit_te_leggen_1_786268
  6. CS Lewis, The abolition of man, Uitgeverij Kok, 2002 (1943), p.43-44. Lewis further notes that it would be worthwhile to consider whether an instinct for concern for posterity or for the preservation of the species actually exists . He writes: ,I don’t notice it in myself; yet I am someone who tends to think about the distant future quite often; I read Olaf Stapledon [a British philosopher and author of science fiction books] with great pleasure., (p46)
  7. Emanuel Rutten: What are moral values?
  8. Naturalism (also known as ‘materialism’), is a philosophical paradigm in which everything can be explained in terms of natural causes. Physical matter is the only reality — everything can be explained in terms of matter and physical phenomena. Naturalism by definition excludes any Supernatural Actor or activity. Therefore, naturalism is atheism. (http://www.allaboutphilosophy.org/dutch/naturalisme.htm)
  9. Emanuel Rutten: What are moral values?
  10. Ibid
  11. Why do Atheists Insult Christians? http://findingtruthtoday.typepad.com
  12. Richard Dawkins. River out of Eden – A Darwinian view of life. 1995. p132.
  13. Norman L. Geisler & Frank Turek. I don’t have enough faith to be an atheist. Ark Media, Amsterdam, 2009. p211.

 

read more

  • The Abolition of Man: CS Lewis
  • Euthyphro dilemma: consideration from a Biblical perspective
  • Christianity: Christian foundation of Western civilization
  • Radical Skepticism: Evil Spirit Hypothesis (Descartes)
  • The burden of proof also lies with an atheist in the debate with a theist

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