The conflicts in the Great Lakes region in Central Africa since the 1990s until now can be characterized as extremely violent and complex. Historical, political, economic and ethnic factors are intertwined in an ongoing situation of threat and violence. This article provides an overview of how the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo has developed in recent years and the future prospects for the conflict area.
The peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a complex task.
Conducting a peace process in the DRC was a complex task: the rebels were not involved in the negotiations, the Rwandan government refused to recognize the Rwandan troops in the DRC and the inflexible attitude of President Kabila did not contribute to the acceleration of the process . Nevertheless, the first ceasefire was signed in Lusaka on July 10, 1999, initiating the peace process. Following the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire, the UN declared its willingness to send a peacekeeping force. UN Secretary Kofi Annan described the difficult, perhaps oppressive, circumstances in the DRC as follows:
‘The huge size of the country, the degradation of its infrastructure, the intensity of its climate, the intractable nature of some aspects of the conflict, the number of parties, the high levels of mutual suspicion, the large population displacements, the ready availability of small arms, the general climate of impunity and the substitution of armed force for the rule of law in much of the territory combine to make the Democratic Republic of the Congo a highly complex environment for peacekeeping.’
These words indicate a large -scale, expensive mission, but this mission would be carried out in three phases: first, 90 military liaison officers would be sent to the warring parties’ headquarters, followed by an observation force of approximately 500 military observers in phase two. MILOBs would settle on the site. The third phase would then involve strengthening these MILOBs through a peacekeeping force. The UN mandate of MONUC, the acronym of Mission de lorganization des Nations Unies au Congo, only included research, observation and supervision. This is in contrast to the mandate that various parties requested; namely peace enforcement.
Phase 1 MONUC
In August 1999, phase 1 of MONUC started with the deployment of 90 liaison officers. Phase 2 was deployed more intensively due to the frequent violations of the ceasefire. On February 25, the Security Council, under resolution 1291, reinforced MONUC with 500 MILOBs and 5,500 blue helmets. The UN soldiers were mandated under Chapter Seven, but were only allowed to use force in self-defense. It was not that the UN acted as a buffer or separated or disarmed the parties, but that they mapped the movements of the parties involved. This made it possible to check whether the parties were adhering to the ceasefire and the agreed withdrawal. However, the armed and ethnic violence of the rebel militias was difficult to observe alongside the fighting of the official parties. The withdrawal of the parties was extremely slow and the security situation was far from stable. The civilian population in particular bore the brunt of the many plunderings and rapes committed by the rebel armies in the East of the DRC, the Kivu provinces in particular bearing the brunt. The difficult development of the peace process is explained as follows (Cilliers and Malan; 2000):
(…) the Lusaka agreement is not between two state parties. It is also not between a beleaguered government and an armed opposition movement. The agreement is between a beleaguered government, five other governments that are party to the conflict, and two ill-defined and ever-shifting armed internal resistance movements. Moreover, there are a plethora of extremely dangerous and troublesome armed groups that are party to the conflict, but not party to the ceasefire agreement. Consent is thus very delicate, and the threat of violence and non-compliance ever-present.
Reasons for peace failure
There were two reasons for the failure of the Lusaka ceasefire. As Rogier (2003) describes it, it recoup their investment, which refers to the economic benefits of progress for various parties. For the warring parties, the war was a way to survive, which is especially true for the genocidal Hutu rebels, as the Tutsi regime would not welcome them with open arms in Rwanda. In addition, all parties did not trust each other to comply with the agreement: each party accused the other party of a double agenda, and used this as a pretext for having a double agenda itself.
A second reason for the failure was the weak peace enforcement mechanism. The blue helmets were initially unable to force rebels to, for example, hand over weapons, which meant that the UN was very weak in the first phases of the mission in the DRC.
Reinforcements for the MONUC
As a result, in 2002 the Security Council approved an increase of 8,700 blue helmets. This reinforcement started on December 4, 2002 under resolution 1445. The Secretary General wanted to change the structure of the mission to give troops greater capabilities and authority in the face of slow progress and limited capabilities. In the spring of 2003, this reinforcement proved to be insufficient, when violence flared up between Ugandan and Rwandan troops. The withdrawal of troops from Uganda as agreed in Luanda, a second rapprochement during the summer of 2002 between the DRC, Rwanda and the DRC and Uganda, created a power vacuum, causing several violent clashes to break out. The MONUC units are unable to protect the civilian population.
Phase 2 MONUC
It was necessary to strengthen the MONUC units. The time to bridge this reinforcement was filled by French units under the European Security and Defense Policy. On June 12, 2003, operation EUFOR RD Congo was launched with 2,000 soldiers under UN Security Council Resolution 1671. Its mandate was under Chapter Seven, which gave it a lot of freedom in protecting the first priority of stabilizing the district capital Bunia. The mission was carried out particularly effectively and efficiently and served as a stimulus for the new MONUC units. These MONUC units were reinforced in September to a total of 10,800 troops. The MONUC mission was mandated as an enforcement mission and they were able to take over the heavy equipment from the EUFOR0 mission, which meant that heavier weapons and attack helicopters were available. The DDRRR process could begin: disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, rehabilitation and reintegration.
Reinforcement appears to be insufficient
A year later, the mission was significantly reinforced again with 5,900 troops, bringing the total to a record number of 16,800 troops. Although this number of troops makes the MONUC mission the largest UN mission ever, the intervention force can be considered relatively small in comparison. A country the size of Western Europe cannot be controlled by just 17,000 men. Although the new mandate leads to multiple options and military space, the fact remains that a shortage of troops and a small mandate do not contribute to accelerated peace and stability. As the International Rescue Committee puts it:
“The UN peacekeeping mission in Congo, known as MONUC, is charged with keeping the peace but has never had sufficient means or political backing to fulfill its mandate. Resources available to MONUC remain inadequate for the scope of Congo’s needs. According to Ohanlon and
Singer (2004), 100,000 troops would be necessary for an actual breakthrough in the DRC. The peace process got off to a difficult start in 2005 . In addition to the various states involved in the conflict, the rebels are not above leaving the negotiating table more than once.
Positive sounds
Nevertheless, positive voices have been heard from the DRC since 2006. The transition period from 2003 that was controlled by the international order came to an end in 2006 with the elections, the first since 1965, of a democratically, legitimately elected president. On December 6, Joseph Kaliba will become the new president of the DRC in Kinshasa after two rounds of voting. This concerns the arrival of the so-called Third Republic. A peace conference will also be held in the spring of 2008. The Conference for Peace, Security and Development in North and South Kivu started in Goma, capital of North Kivu, to conclude a ceasefire agreement. Government representatives, international observers, religious leaders and rebel leaders. Although the treaty is potentially a step in the right direction, there is much to be said for its implementation. Many rebels do not adhere to the treaty and things are still going on in the DRC.
Future vision
But what does the future of the DRC look like? The peace process is proving difficult. This is mainly due to the countries involved not gaining economic benefits from establishing a peaceful situation. Countries such as Rwanda and Uganda benefit more from the war situation by exploiting raw materials from the DRC. It is not inexplicable that Rwanda suddenly became one of the largest diamond exporting countries in 1997.
This is one explanation why the conflict will not resolve itself without international help. Pressure from the international community has led to table talks and is also responsible for limiting the profitable and militarily workable situation in the DRC. However, the UN has also proven to be inefficient with its inadequate mandates and resources to MONUC. The Security Council was unable.
Various sources indicate that the situation in the DRC is still very bad. According to the Fund for Peace, the DRC ranks a dire seventh in the 2007 Failed States Index. However, the situation has improved slightly in the past year due to the return of refugees to the DRC and the disarming of rebels. In addition, the Congolese government army is increasingly taking shape through training by UN soldiers. The peace process contributes to peace, but the civilian population is still suffering from food shortages, diseases and violence. The situation in the DRC is still unsafe, mainly in the East, but a new, escalating war such as in 1996 and 1998 is not in the offing.